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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This case appeal arises from an order of the District 
Court entered January 22, 1999 in connection with a 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy on behalf of debtors Joseph R. and 
Natalie G. Solfanelli. Of the numerous assertions made at 
the outset of this litigation, only two major issues remain. 
The principal issue is whether the Solfanellis' secured 
creditor, Meridian Bank ("Meridian"), is barred from 
pursuing a deficiency claim against the Solfanellis as a 
result of its conduct in connection with its disposition of 
the primary collateral securing the Solfanellis' debt. The 
District Court concluded that (1) Meridian's eleven month 
delay in selling the stock was commercially unreasonable, 
and that (2) Meridian's handling of a claim against Keefe, 
 
                                2 
  
Bruyette, and Woods, the broker Meridian retained to sell 
the FEB stock, which claim was based upon Keefe, 
Bruyette, and Woods' undisclosed purchase of the major 
portion of the FEB stock and resale two days later at a 
substantial profit, was also commercially unreasonable. 
 
Meridian challenges this decision, arguing that the 
Solfanellis did not have any cognizable interest in the Keefe, 
Bruyette, and Woods settlement. The Solfanellis argue that 
their indebtedness to Meridian should be deemed satisfied 
on the grounds that the delay in selling the stock was 
commercially unreasonable. 
 
We agree with the District Court that the Solfanellis' 
argument is meritorious. We also find that the District 
Court did not err in finding that Meridian acted in a 
commercially unreasonable manner when it negotiated a 
resolution of its claim against Keefe, Bruyette, and Woods 
without first notifying the Solfanellis, and then attempted to 
disguise the transaction. 
 
We are called upon, also, to consider whether Meridian 
violated the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay in 
garnishing accounts containing post-petition funds. 
Meridian contends that it could garnish these accounts by 
virtue of the parties' Stipulation and Security Agreement 
("Agreement"). We agree, however, with the District Court, 
that the automatic stay was violated because the parties' 
Agreement did not authorize the attachment of post-petition 
funds. Furthermore, we find that the District Court 
properly upheld the award to the Solfanellis of punitive 
damages in the amount of $10,000 for the violation of the 
automatic stay. Because this case is already the subject of 
two published opinions, each exhaustively setting forth the 
procedural and factual background, we will not do so here, 
but instead refer interested parties to these prior  
dispositions.1 We set forth only those facts crucial to a 
resolution of the disputes here. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The District Court's ruling is reported at 230 B.R. 54 (M.D.Pa. 1999); 
the Bankruptcy Court's ruling is reported at 206 B.R. 699 (Bankr. 
M.D.Pa. 1996). 
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I. 
 
We have appellate jurisdiction over the District Court's 
decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS158 (d) andS1291. We 
are, in effect, the second "appellate" court to consider the 
bases of the Bankruptcy Court's opinion. In undertaking 
our review, we stand in the shoes of the District Court, 
applying a clearly erroneous standard to the Bankruptcy 
Court's findings of fact and a plenary standard to that 
court's legal conclusions. In re Krystal Cadillac Oldsmobile 
GMC Truck, 142 F.3d 631, 635, (3rd Cir. 1998); In re 
Siciliano, 13 F.3d 748, 750 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations 
omitted). 
 
The major question we address is whether the District 
Court erred in holding that Meridian's sale of the FEB 
shares was improperly conducted. Its outcome hinges on 
whether two aspects of Meridian's handling of the collateral 
were commercially reasonable under Pennsylvania law: (1) 
Meridian's retention of the FEB shares for 11 months prior 
to the sale through Keefe, Bruyette, and Woods; and (2) 
Meridian's handling of the claim against Keefe, Bruyette, 
and Woods.2 Pennsylvania law provides as follows for the 
disposition of collateral: 
 
       (c) Manner of disposition. -- Disposition of the 
       collateral may be by public or private proceedings and 
       may be made by way of one or more contracts. Sale or 
       other disposition may be as a unit or in parcels and at 
       any time and place and on any terms but every aspect 
       of the disposition including the method, manner, time, 
       place and terms must be commercially reasonable. 
 
13 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. S 9504 (emphasis added). We agree 
with the District Court that the test to determine 
"commercial reasonableness" should be whether the sale's 
every aspect is characterized by: (1) good faith, (2) 
avoidance of loss, and (3) an effective realization. United 
States v. Willis, 593 F.2d 247, 259 (6th Cir. 1979). We also 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In light of our decision in the Solfanellis' favor, we decline to 
address 
whether Meridian elected strict foreclosure on the collateral. This 
alternative ground for recovery was fairly presented to and rejected by 
the District Court. 
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agree with the District Court that, in liquidating the 
collateral, the creditor acts as the debtor's fiduciary and 
has a corresponding good faith duty to maximize the 
proceeds of the collateral's sale. United States ex rel. Small 
Bus. Admin. v. Chatlins Dep't Store, 506 F. Supp. 108, 111 
(E.D. Pa. 1980). 
 
Here, the Solfanellis question the commercial 
reasonableness of the sale, and the burden falls to Meridian 
to show the sales' commercial reasonableness under the 
"totality of the circumstances." Savoy v. Beneficial 
Consumer Discount, 503 Pa. 74, 77 (1983). Wefind that 
Meridian has not met this burden. Meridian justifies its 
failure to sell the stock upon (1) Mr. Solfanelli's refusal to 
consent to the sale of the stock by Meridian, and (2) the 
terms of the parties' Stipulation and Security Agreement. 
Moreover, Meridian insists, as the Bankruptcy Court held, 
that Mr. Solfanelli's failure to demand a sale of the stock 
precludes any claim based upon the untimeliness of the 
sale. 
 
When Meridian sought Mr. Solfanelli's agreement to sell 
the shares in early 1991, he declined to give his consent. 
Moreover, it is undisputed that Mr. Solfanelli did not at any 
point demand that the shares be sold. Neither of these 
facts, however, has the significance that Meridian would 
attribute to it. First, we note that the undisputed record 
evidence indicates that the Solfanellis made no request that 
the stock be held at any point between March 1991 and the 
end of January 1992, from our point of view the crucial 
period for present purposes. Moreover, even if such a 
request had been made, it would be only one factor in 
determining the commercial reasonableness of the sale and 
would not preclude liability if the totality of the 
circumstances indicated that the sale was commercially 
unreasonable. 
 
Ultimately, Meridian's argument regarding the debtor's 
requests is a red herring. In reality, rather than trying to 
honor a debtor's request through forbearance, Meridian 
focused on the risk that the FEB shares' value might fall 
below the loan balance. After Meridian focused on that, 
there were repeated days when the stock sold for $16 or 
$17 a share. Meridian neither engaged a broker, nor put in 
 
                                5 
  
place a monitoring scheme or strategy for executing on this 
collateral. At trial, Meridian did not offer any credible 
explanation for retaining the stock for eleven months after 
filing the certificate of default, while the stock continued to 
deteriorate. While plaintiff's expert, a bank president, 
testified that Meridian did not act in a commercially 
reasonable manner in holding the stock, Meridian's expert 
declined to give an opinion on the matter, one way or the 
other. It is evident to us that Meridian was derelict in its 
responsibility to move ahead in good faith and to realize as 
much as possible for the Solfanellis' benefit. 
 
Nor can we accept the proposition that a demand for a 
sale of the collateral is a prerequisite in these 
circumstances for a claim based on a commercially 
unreasonable delay. FDIC v. Caliendo, 802 F. Supp. 575 
(D.N.H. 1992), which the Bankruptcy Court relied upon for 
that proposition, is inapposite here. We agree with the 
District Court's analysis regarding Caliendo. In that case, 
the District Court for the District of New Hampshire found 
that where a loan was over-collateralized, clearly not the 
status in the present case, the secured creditor has a duty 
to preserve the value of the collateral, pursuant to U.C.C. 
S 9-207(1), only if the debtor requests that the collateral be 
redeemed. The Court in Caliendo did not address the 
creditor's duty under S 9-504 to dispose of collateral in a 
commercially reasonable manner. The Solfanellis have not 
argued that Meridian had a duty to preserve the value of 
the FEB stock, and thus we agree with the District Court 
that Caliendo does not bear on this case. Even if S 9-207 
were applicable, however, we think it clear that Meridian 
cannot be relieved of its obligation under S 9-504 to dispose 
of the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner, 
irrespective of a debtor's instruction to sell or to hold. 
 
Similarly unavailing is Meridian's claim that it is 
immunized from an "unreasonable delay" claim by the 
Solfanellis based upon the terms of the Stipulation and 
Security Agreement signed in December of 1990. Paragraph 
15 of the Agreement provides: 
 
       No delay or omission in exercising any right, power, or 
       remedy accruing to the Bank upon breach or default 
       by Debtors. . . shall impair any such right, power, or 
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       remedy of the Bank, nor shall it be construed to be a 
       waiver of any such breach or default theretofore or 
       thereafter occurring. 
 
Fortunately for debtors such as the Solfanellis, a bank's 
duty to conduct a commercially reasonable sale is not 
waivable by any such contract terms. Ford Motor Credit v. 
Lototsky, 549 F. Supp. 996, 1001 - 1002 (E.D. Pa. 1982), 
Willis, 593 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1979). In particular, we have 
held previously that despite agreements between the 
parties, securities must be liquidated in good faith and in 
a commercially reasonable manner. In re Kaplan , 143 F.3d 
807, 818 (3d Cir. 1998). Thus, we are unimpressed by 
Meridian's invocation of 13 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. S 9501 ("the 
parties may by agreement determine the standards by 
which the fulfillment of these rights and duties is to be 
measured if such standards are not manifestly 
unreasonable") for the proposition that the Agreement is in 
this manner binding. An Agreement provision attempting to 
expunge a commercial reasonableness requirement is per 
se "manifestly unreasonable." 
 
In addition, as did the District Court, we will affirm the 
Bankruptcy Court's finding that Meridian breached its duty 
of good faith in making blatantly false statements with an 
intention to deceive Mr. Solfanelli. The Bankruptcy Court 
found not only that Meridian never informed Mr. Solfanelli 
of its dispute with Keefe, Bruyette, and Woods regarding 
the sale or the subsequent negotiations and settlement, but 
also deceived Mr. Solfanelli when he asked. The Bankruptcy 
Court properly found that the potential claim against Keefe, 
Bruyette, and Woods for "flipping" the shares was an 
integral part of the "disposition" of the collateral. 
 
In sum, we agree with the Solfanellis that Meridian 
unreasonably "sat" on this stock for 11 months, i.e., from 
March, 1991, when Meridian first declared a default, until 
February, 1992, when the stock was sold. The stock should 
have been sold at those points in time when its price 
substantially satisfied the debt. In addition, Meridian 
employed subterfuge regarding its sale of the stock to and 
dispute with Keefe, Bruyette, and Woods. Because Meridian 
failed to sell the collateral in good faith and in a 
commercially reasonable manner, we presume as a matter 
 
                                7 
  
of law that the collateral's value equals the amount of the 
Solfanellis' indebtedness. Meridian contends that the record 
evidence demonstrates that the FEB stock could not alone 
satisfy the Solfanellis' debt at any point. That may or may 
not be true, but the FEB stock was not the only collateral 
securing the loan. Taking into account all of the available 
collateral, Meridian's own evidence makes clear that had 
Meridian sold the FEB stock when it was trading at over 
$16 per share, which it was for at least 30 days after the 
filing of the certificate of default, then the value of the 
collateral would have exceeded the Solfanellis' total 
indebtedness. Accordingly, Meridian may not seek a 
deficiency claim. See 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 9504(c). 
 
II. 
 
The remaining issue is whether Meridian violated the 
automatic stay by attaching the Solfanellis' bank accounts 
containing post-petition funds, and if so, whether the 
Bankruptcy Court reasonably awarded punitive damages to 
Mrs. Solfanelli. The Bankruptcy Court found that Meridian 
was overzealous and negligent in its willful attachment of 
the Solfanellis post-petition funds: 
 
       the Certificate of Default . . . terminated the automatic 
       stay. The further garnishment of the accounts were, 
       thus, appropriately performed with the exception of the 
       [post-petition] funds. While that may have been a 
       simple oversight if occasioned by an inexperienced 
       attorney, Bank counsel. . . was exceptionally 
       knowledgeable of the bankruptcy provisions. That is 
       not to say that said counsel acted maliciously in 
       pursuing these post-petition funds. On the contrary, 
       there is absolutely no evidence that the Bank was 
       anything but overzealous, though negligent, in 
       sweeping the accounts. Still, such disregard is 
       sufficient to support an award of punitive damages. 
 
In re Solfanelli, 206 B.R. at 705. 
 
Meridian argues that it did not violate the automatic stay 
by this seizure because the stay was not in effect. We agree 
that Meridian was granted some relief from the stay. 
However, this relief was only granted as to specific assets, 
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not including bank accounts or post-petition earnings. The 
Agreement between the parties permitted the Solfanellis to 
use cash collateral and provided that upon certification of 
default 
 
       [the] Bank shall be entitled without further notice to 
       relief from the automatic stay of Section 362 and shall 
       be allowed to proceed with the exercise of all remedies 
       available to it in respect of the Existing Indebtedness 
       and Collateral. . . . 
 
(emphasis added). "Collateral" was defined elsewhere in the 
Agreement and included other enumerated items but not 
the post-petition funds. We agree with the District Court 
that Meridian was permitted only to execute against 
"Collateral" and that the post-petition funds were not 
"Collateral." Finally, Meridian did not procure a 
replacement lien and did not have any rights against the 
funds by virtue of a prepetition lien. 11 U.S.C.S 552(a). 
Accordingly, we agree with the District Court and 
Bankruptcy Court that Meridian violated the automatic stay 
since it exceeded its rights under the Bankruptcy Code and 
the Agreement. 
 
The Bankruptcy Court may award punitive damages for 
a stay violation pursuant to 11 U.S.C. S 362(h): 
 
       An individual injured by any willful violation of a stay 
       provided by this section shall recover actual damages, 
       including costs and attorneys fees, and, in appropriate 
       circumstances, may recover punitive damages. 
 
The Bankruptcy Court, to which we give deference in its 
factual findings, reasonably found that Meridian's violation 
was willful; Meridian was aware of the stay and 
intentionally garnished the accounts containing 
postpetition funds. The Bankruptcy Court's ruling is in 
accord with our holdings in this area. See In re Atlantic 
Bus. and Community Corp., 901 F.2d 325, 328 (3d Cir. 
1990) ("willful violation" requires that defendant knew of 
stay and that actions which violated stay were intentional); 
See also In re Landsdale Family Restaurants, 977 F.2d 826, 
829 (3d. Cir. 1992) (violation "willful" if creditor knows of 
stay and takes intentional action violating it, and good faith 
belief insufficient to escape liability). 
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Once the Bankruptcy Court finds a willful violation, it 
has discretion to impose punitive damages in "appropriate 
circumstances." We find that the Bankruptcy Court's award 
of $10,000 punitive damages is not clearly erroneous, but 
rather, appropriate, and we will let it stand. 
 
III. 
 
For all the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court's judgment. We remand to the Bankruptcy Court to 
enter judgment in favor of Meridian on Count II and in 
favor of Natalie Solfanelli, as well as Joseph Solfanelli, on 
Count VII. 
 
A True Copy: 
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       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
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